US vs Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-5272

15 Phil 488

March 19, 1910

Petitioner: The United States

Respondent: Ah Chong

FACTS: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice "Who is there?", but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "If you enter the room, I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed the door and believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon, he called to his employers and rushed back int the room to secure the bandages to bind up the wound. Defendant was charged with murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally responsible for murder in the case at bar.

HELD: The Court held that Ah Chong must be acquitted. 

Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intrude. Par. 1, Art XI of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that in order for the act to be justified, the requisites must be present.

Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact): 

1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim

2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression

3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression, there would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home and the knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. 

The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to Honest Mistake of Fact. The Court acquits Ah Chong.

• Criminal Law 1: Honest Mistake of Fact (Textbook: Reyes - Book 1, Professor: Atty. Amurao)

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Cuenca vs People

G.R. No. L-27586

June 26, 1970

Petitioner: Ernesto Cuenca y Cuevas

Respondent: People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals 

FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that the CFI of Manila, convicting appellant Ernesto Cuenca, who at the time of arrest of arrest on January 3, 1963 was on duty at the Philippine Savings Bank as a special watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm, and Ithaca .45 pistol, of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and seven rounds of ammunition and sentencing him to imprisonment for one year and to pay the costs. Appellant's main argument for defense was that in his employment with the above-mentioned security agency made him to believe that the license to possess the firearm in question was with the owner of the agency,  Jose Forbes.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of Jose Forbes to comply with his duty to obtain such license, before he issued said firearm and ammunition to his aforementioned employee.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The appellant is not guilty of the crime charged.

It should be noted that the Bataan Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as such. Consequently, it may legally engage the services of competent persons to discharge the duties of special watchmen and security guards and provide them, as such, with the corresponding firearms and ammunitions. The agency is this supposed to obtain the license necessary therefore. Had it done so, there would be no question about the absence of any criminal liability on the part of the appellant herein for the possession of the firearm and ammunition in question.

Petition is therefore GRANTED. 

• Criminal Law 1: Animus Possendi (Textbook: Reyes - Book 1, Professor: Atty. Amurao)

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Mitsubishi Motors vs Chrysler Philippines Labor Union

G.R. No. 148738

June 29, 2004

Petitioner: Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation

Respondents: Chrysler Philippines Labor Union and Nelson Paras

FACTS: Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi Arabia and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop from November 1, 1994 to March 3, 1995.

On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He had an orientation on May 15, 1996 and afterwhich, with respect to the company’s rules and guidelines, started reporting for work on May 27, 1996.

Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisors rating Paras’ performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of the MMPC’s company policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.

Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an average performance rating but it is a rate which would still qualify him to be regularized. But as part of the company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the recommendations of the supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for regularization.

Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25, 1996. This letter’s intent is to formally relieve him off of his services and position effective the date since he failed to meet the company’s standards.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Paras’ termination was legal or not.

HELD: The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The Court stresses the existence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that the employer must inform the employee of the standards they were to meet in order to be granted regularization and that such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship agreement.

Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised of the standards upon which his regularization would be based during the orientation. His first day to report for work was on May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. The Court conforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code providing that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. This case, the Labor Code pertains to 180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, he was actually already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code. His position as a regularized employee is thus secured until further notice.

• Persons and Family Relations: Period of Effectivity of Laws (Reference: New Civil Code of the Philippines, Professor: Atty. Sagayo)

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Amigable vs Cuenca

G.R. No. L-26400

43 SCRA 360

February 29, 1972

Petitioner: Victoria Amigable

Respondent: Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango and Gorordo Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a case in CFI Cebu.

Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been prescribed; 3) Government cannot be sued without its consent and; 4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such. 

CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and possession of the said land and thus dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent. 

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent.

HELD: In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains as the rightful owner of the lot. 

She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. 

Petition is partly GRANTED. 

• Constitutional Law 1: Immunity from suit (Texbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524

December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).  The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. 

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. 

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. 

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. 

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly. 

• Constitutional Law 1: Immunity from suit (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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