US vs Ah Chong

G.R. No. L-5272

15 Phil 488

March 19, 1910

Petitioner: The United States

Respondent: Ah Chong

FACTS: Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He was afraid of bad elements. One evening, before going to bed, he locked himself in his room by placing a chair against the door. After having gone to bed, he was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice "Who is there?", but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out again, "If you enter the room, I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by the chair that had been placed the door and believing that he was being attacked he seized a kitchen knife, struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon, he called to his employers and rushed back int the room to secure the bandages to bind up the wound. Defendant was charged with murder.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ah Chong may be held criminally responsible for murder in the case at bar.

HELD: The Court held that Ah Chong must be acquitted. 

Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in killing the intrude. Par. 1, Art XI of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that in order for the act to be justified, the requisites must be present.

Requisites (Honest Mistake of Fact): 

1) Unlawful agression on the part of the victim

2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression

3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

If the victim was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been unlawful aggression, there would have been a necessity on the part of Ah Chong to defend himself and/or his home and the knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent or repel such aggression. 

The act done by Ah Chong was merely an act done due to Honest Mistake of Fact. The Court acquits Ah Chong.

• Criminal Law 1: Honest Mistake of Fact (Textbook: Reyes - Book 1, Professor: Atty. Amurao)

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Cuenca vs People

G.R. No. L-27586

June 26, 1970

Petitioner: Ernesto Cuenca y Cuevas

Respondent: People of the Philippines and Court of Appeals 

FACTS: Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that the CFI of Manila, convicting appellant Ernesto Cuenca, who at the time of arrest of arrest on January 3, 1963 was on duty at the Philippine Savings Bank as a special watchman and security guard of the Bataan Veterans Security Agency to which the firearm, and Ithaca .45 pistol, of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and seven rounds of ammunition and sentencing him to imprisonment for one year and to pay the costs. Appellant's main argument for defense was that in his employment with the above-mentioned security agency made him to believe that the license to possess the firearm in question was with the owner of the agency,  Jose Forbes.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant is guilty of the crime charged owing to the failure of Jose Forbes to comply with his duty to obtain such license, before he issued said firearm and ammunition to his aforementioned employee.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. The appellant is not guilty of the crime charged.

It should be noted that the Bataan Veterans Security Agency is duly licensed to operate as such. Consequently, it may legally engage the services of competent persons to discharge the duties of special watchmen and security guards and provide them, as such, with the corresponding firearms and ammunitions. The agency is this supposed to obtain the license necessary therefore. Had it done so, there would be no question about the absence of any criminal liability on the part of the appellant herein for the possession of the firearm and ammunition in question.

Petition is therefore GRANTED. 

• Criminal Law 1: Animus Possendi (Textbook: Reyes - Book 1, Professor: Atty. Amurao)

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Mitsubishi Motors vs Chrysler Philippines Labor Union

G.R. No. 148738

June 29, 2004

Petitioner: Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation

Respondents: Chrysler Philippines Labor Union and Nelson Paras

FACTS: Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi Arabia and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop from November 1, 1994 to March 3, 1995.

On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He had an orientation on May 15, 1996 and afterwhich, with respect to the company’s rules and guidelines, started reporting for work on May 27, 1996.

Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisors rating Paras’ performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of the MMPC’s company policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.

Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an average performance rating but it is a rate which would still qualify him to be regularized. But as part of the company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the recommendations of the supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not considered for regularization.

Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25, 1996. This letter’s intent is to formally relieve him off of his services and position effective the date since he failed to meet the company’s standards.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Paras’ termination was legal or not.

HELD: The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The Court stresses the existence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that the employer must inform the employee of the standards they were to meet in order to be granted regularization and that such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship agreement.

Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised of the standards upon which his regularization would be based during the orientation. His first day to report for work was on May 27, 1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180) days. The Court conforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code providing that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. This case, the Labor Code pertains to 180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the last paragraph of Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, he was actually already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code. His position as a regularized employee is thus secured until further notice.

• Persons and Family Relations: Period of Effectivity of Laws (Reference: New Civil Code of the Philippines, Professor: Atty. Sagayo)

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Amigable vs Cuenca

G.R. No. L-26400

43 SCRA 360

February 29, 1972

Petitioner: Victoria Amigable

Respondent: Nicolas Cuenca, as Commissioner of Public Highways and the Republic of the Philippines

FACTS: Victoria Amigable rightfully owned a lot in Cebu City which was used by the government for Mango and Gorordo Avenues without her permission and without proper negotiation of sales. Because of this, she filed a case in CFI Cebu.

Defendants argue that 1) Action was premature; 2) Right of action has already been prescribed; 3) Government cannot be sued without its consent and; 4) Cebu already agreed to use the land as such. 

CFI rendered a decision which states that Amigable cannot restore and recover her ownership and possession of the said land and thus dismissed the complaint on grounds that state may not be sued without its consent. 

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Amigable may rightfully sue the government without its consent.

HELD: In the case of Ministerio vs Court of First Instance of Cebu, it was held that when the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent.

In the case at bar, since no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of the certificate of title and plaintiff has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of the lot to the government, then she remains as the rightful owner of the lot. 

She could then bring an action to recover possession of the land anytime, because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since such action is not feasible at this time since the lot has been used for other purposes, the only relief left is for the government to make due compensation of the exact amount, price or value of the lot at the time of the taking. 

Petition is partly GRANTED. 

• Constitutional Law 1: Immunity from suit (Texbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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Holy See vs Rosario

G.R. No. 101949

238 SCRA 524

December 1, 1994

Petitioner: The Holy See

Respondent: Hon. Elidberto Rosario, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of

RTC Makati, Branch 61 and Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

FACTS: Petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land. Lot 5-A, registered under the name Holy See, was contiguous to Lot 5-B and 5-D under the name of Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).  The land was donated by the Archdiocese of Manila to the Papal Nuncio, which represents the Holy See, who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City, Rome, Italy, for his residence.

Said lots were sold through an agent to Ramon Licup who assigned his rights to respondents Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.

When the squatters refuse to vacate the lots, a dispute arose between the two parties because both were unsure whose responsibility was it to evict the squatters from said lots. Respondent Starbright Sales Enterprises Inc. insists that Holy See should clear the property while Holy See says that respondent corporation should do it or the earnest money will be returned. With this, Msgr. Cirilios, the agent, subsequently returned the P100,000 earnest money. 

The same lots were then sold to Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation.

Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc. filed a suit for annulment of the sale, specific performance and damages against Msgr. Cirilios, PRC as well as Tropicana Properties and Development Corporation. The Holy See and Msgr. Cirilos moved to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity from suit. RTC denied the motion on ground that petitioner already "shed off" its sovereign immunity by entering into a business contract. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was also denied hence this special civil action for certiorari was forwarded to the Supreme Court. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Holy See can invoke sovereign immunity.

HELD: The Court held that Holy See may properly invoke sovereign immunity for its non-suability. As expressed in Sec. 2 Art II of the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of International Law are adopted by our Courts and thus shall form part of the laws of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.

It was noted in Article 31(A) of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations that diplomatic envoy shall be granted immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction of the receiving state over any real action relating to private immovable property. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic missionary to the Republic of the Philippines and is thus exempted from local jurisdiction and is entitled to the immunity rights of a diplomatic mission or embassy in this Court. 

Furthermore, it shall be understood that in the case at bar, the petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely, the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. 

The Holy See is immune from suit because the act of selling the lot of concern is non-propriety in nature. The lot was acquired through a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila, not for a commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio thereof. The transfer of the property and its subsequent disposal are likewise clothed with a governmental (non-proprietal) character as petitioner sold the lot not for profit or gain rather because it merely cannot evict the squatters living in said property. 

In view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the complaints were dismissed accordingly. 

• Constitutional Law 1: Immunity from suit (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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Macariola vs Asuncion

A.M. No. 133-J

114 SCRA 77

May 31, 1982

Petitioner: Bernardita R. Mecariola

Respondent: Hon. Elias B. Asuncion,
in his capacity as Judge of Court of First Instance (CFI) Leyte

FACTS: Respondent judge rendered a final decision in Civil Case No. 2012 for lack of an appeal. A project of partition was submitted to him, which he later approved. Among the parties thereto was petitioner Macariola.

One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This lot was adjudicated t the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five (5) lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.

The fifth lot, Lot 1184-E, was sold to a Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a portion of the lot to respondent Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria. Spouses Asuncion and Galapon conveyed their respective shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc, owned and managed by Judge Asuncion.

Macariola then filed an instant complaint in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion charging him with "Acts Unbecoming of a Judge" invoking Art 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code, pars.1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of RA No. 3019, Section 12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. A certain Judge Nepomuceno however dismissed such complaints.  Hence, the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Asuncion's act does not violate the above-mentioned provisions.

HELD: The Court held that respondent Judge Asuncion's acts did not constitute an "Act Unbecoming of a Judge" but he was reminded to be more discreet in his private and business activities for next time.

Article 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. Respondent judge purchased the said lot after the decision rendered was already final because no party filed for an appeal within the reglementary period which makes the lot in question no longer the subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from plaintiffs, rather from a Dr. Arcadio Galapon. 

Petition is hereby DENIED. 

• Constitutional Law 1 (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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Bautista vs Salonga

G.R. No. 86439

172 SCRA 160

April 19, 1989

Petitioner: Mary Conception Bautista

Respondent: Jovito Salonga

FACTS: On August 27, 1987, President Cory Aquino appointed petitioner Bautista as permanent Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR). Bautista took her oath of office on December 22, 1988 to Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan and immediately acted as such.

On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments (CoA) wrote a letter to Bautista requesting for her presence along with several documents at the office of CoA on January 19. Bautista refused to be placed under CoA's review hence this petition filed with the Supreme Court.

While waiting for the progress of the case, President Aquino appointed Hesiquio R. Mallillin as "Acting Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights" but he was not able to sit in his appointive office because of Bautista's refusal to surrender her post. Malilin invoked EO 163-A which provides that the tenure of the Chairman and the Commissioners of the CHR should be at the pleasure of the President thus stating that Bautista shall be subsequently removed as well. 

ISSUES: 

1) Whether or not the President's appointment is considered constitutional.

2) Whether or not Bautista's appointment is subject to CoA's confirmation.

3) Whether or not President should extend her appointment on January 14, 1989.

HELD:

The Court held that the it is within the authority of the President, vested upon her by the Constitution, that she appoint Executive officials. The second sentence of the provision Section 16, Article VII provides that the President is authorized by law to appoint, without confirmation of CoA, several government officials. The position of Chairman of CHR is not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides the appointments which are to be made with the confirmation of CoA. It therefore follows that the appointment of the Chairman of CHR by the President is to be made and finalized even without the review or participation of CoA. Bautista's appointment as the Chairman of CHR, therefore, was already a completed act on the day she took her oath as the appointment was finalized upon her acceptance, expressly stated in her oath.

Furthermore, the Court held that the provisions of EO 163-A is unconstitutional and thus cannot be invoked by Mallillin. The Chairman of CHR cannot be removed at the pleasure of the President for it is constitutionally guaranteed that they must have a term of office.

In view of the foregoing, the petition is thus GRANTED and the restraining order for Mallillin was made permanent.

• Constitutional Law 1: 1987 Constitution / Appointments / Appointing Power of the President (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita) 

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Ruffy vs Chief of Staff

G.R. No. L-533

75 Phil 875

August 20, 1956

Petitioners: Ramon Ruffy, et al. 

Respondents: The Chief of Staff, et al.

FACTS: During the Japanese insurrection in the Philippines, military men were assigned at designated camps or military bases all over the country.  Japanese forces went to Mindoro thus forcing petitioner and his band move up the mountains and organize a guerilla outfit and call it the "Bolo area". A certain Capt. Beloncio relieved Ruffy and fellow petitioners of their position and duties in the "Bolo area" by the new authority vested upon him because of the recent change of command. Capt. Beloncio was thus allegedly slain by Ruffy and his fellow petitioners. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were subject to military law at the time the offense was committed, which was at the time of war and the Japanese occupancy.

HELD: The Court held that the petitioners were still subject to military law since members of the Armed Forces were still covered by the National Defense Act, Articles of War and other laws even during an occupation. The act of unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman is considered as a defiance of 95th Article of War held petitioners liable to military jurisdiction and trial. Moreover, they were operating officers, which makes them even more eligible for the military court's jurisdiction. 

In consideration of the foregoing, the petition has no merit and should be dismissed. Thus, the petition is hereby DENIED. 

• Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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Government of the Philippine Islands vs Monte de Piedad

G.R. No. 9959

35 PH 728, 751-753

December 13, 1916

Petitioner: Government of the Philippine Islands, represented by Executive Treasurer

Respondent: El Monte de Piedad Y Caja de Ajorras de Manila

FACTS: On June 3, 1863, a devastating earthquake in the Philippines took place. The Spanish dominions provided $400,000 aid as received by the National Treasury as relief of the victims of the earthquake. The government used the money as such but $80,000 was left untouched and was thus invested to Monte de Piedad bank, which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount. 

In June 1983, the Department of Finance called upon the same bank to return the $80,000 deposited from before. The Monte de Piedad declined to comply with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions of the persons, the Philippine Islands brought a suit against Monte de Piedad for a recovery of the $80,000 together with interest, for the benefit of those persons and their heirs. Respondent refuse to provide the money, hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine government is authorized to file a reimbursement of the money of the people deposited in respondent bank. 

HELD: The Court held that the Philippine government is competent to file a complaint/reimbursement against respondent bank in accordance to the Doctrine of Parens Patriae. The government is the sole protector of the rights of the people thus, it holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws which promote public interest. The government has the right to "take back" the money intended fro people.   The government has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.  

Appellate court decision was affirmed. Petition was thereby GRANTED. The Court ordered that respondent bank return the amount to the rightful heirs with interest in gold or coin in Philippine peso.

• Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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De Leon vs Esguerra

G.R. No. 78059

153 SCRA 602

August 31, 1987

Petitioner: Alfredo M. De Leon, et al.

Respondents: Hon. Benjamin B. Esguerra in his capacity as
OIC Governor in the province of Rizal, et al.

FACTS: Petitioner was elected as Barangay Captain together with other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Municipality of Taytay, Pronice of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Barangay Election Act of 1982. 

Petitioner received a Memorandum from OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra which provided the designation of respondent Florentino Magno as Barangay Captain of the same barangay and the other respondents as members of the barangay Council of the same barangay and municipality. Petitioners maintain that Sec 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 provides that the terms of office shall be six (6) years which shall continue until their successors shall have elected and qualified. Also, in accordance with the recent ratification of the 1987 Constitution, it seems that respindent OIC Governor no longer had the authority to replace them as well as designate successors. 

Petitioner prayed that the Memorandum be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited from taking over their positions.

ISSUE: Whether or not designation of respondents to replace petitioners was valid.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. SC declared that the Memorandum issued by respondent OIC Governor designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Councilmen of Barangay Dolores has no legal force and effect. 

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date therefore, the provisional constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Effectivity of the Constitution is also immediately upon its ratification.

• Constitutional Law 1: 1987 Constitution (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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PVTA vs CIR

G.R. No. L-32052

65 SCRA 416

July 25, 1975

Petitioner: Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration

Respondent: Court of Industrial Relations 

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services (in excess of their 8 regular hours a day) and the failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 444.

• Section 1: The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be of more than eight (8) hours daily.

Petitioner denies allegations for lack of a cause of action and jurisdiction. 

Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari on grounds that the corporation is exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from CA No. 444 which was denied and dismissed by RTC and CA. Motion for Reconsideration were also DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions and is exempt from CA No. 444.

HELD: It is an inherent state function which makes government required to support its people and promote their general welfare. This case explains and portrays the expanded role of government necessitated by the increased responsibility to provide for the general welfare.

The Court held that the distinction and between constituent and ministrant functions, which the Chief Justice points out, is already irrelevant considering the needs of the present time. He says that "The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government obsolete." The distinction between constituent and ministrant functions is now considered obsolete. 

The Court affirms that the Petition as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration be DENIED. 

• Constitutional Law 1: State Functions / Concept of State (Constituent and Ministrant) (Textbook: Cruz, Professor, Atty. Usita)

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Gonzales vs COMELEC

G.R. No. L-28196

21 SCRA 774

November 9, 1967

Petitioner: Ramon A. Gonzalez / Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)

Respondent: Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

FACTS: This case is composed of consolidated cases filed separately by Petitioner Gonzalez and PHILCONSA assailing for the declaration of nullity of RA. No. 4913 and R.B.H. No. 1 and 3. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions (Resolution of Both Houses/R.B.H.):

1. R.B.H No. 1: Proposes that Sec 5, Art VI of Constitution be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120 in accordance with the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among several provinces and that each province shall have at least one (1) member.

2. R.B.H. No. 2: Calls for a convention to propose amendments to the Constitution, which will be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November 1971.

3. R.B.H. No. 3: Proposes that Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution be amended so as to authorize Senators and Members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without the need to forfeit their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which became RA No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people at the general elections on November 14, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of elevtion for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people, and appropriates funds for said election.

Petitioners assail the validity/constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and for the prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails R.B.H No. 1 and 3.

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not RA No. 4913 is unconstitutional.

2.) Whether or not the issue involves a political question.

HELD: 

1.) Pursuant to Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, SC held that there is nothing in this provision that states that the election referred to is special, different from the general election. The Congress deemed it best to submit the amendments for ratification in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections. Petition is therefore DENIED.

2.) SC also noted that the issue is a political question because it attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress and not the authority to take it. A political question is not subject to review by the Court.

• Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: Constitution; Political vs Justiciable Question (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)

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Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 83896

194 SCRA 317

February 22, 1991

Petitioner: Civil Liberties Union

Respondent: Executive Secretary

FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.

EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in addition to their primary positions.

• Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the government and government corporations and receive corresponding compensation thereof.

• Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2) positions other than his primary position.

• Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8, Article VIII.

Constitutional provisions:

• Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during their tenure, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

• Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. 

ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.

It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.

The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.

The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction to the express mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13, Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment. 

WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and is accordingly set aside.

• Constitutional Law 1: CH 2: 1987 Constitution; Supremacy of the Constitution (Textbook: Cruz, Professor: Atty. Usita)
• Statutory Construction: CH 11: Constitutional Construction (Textbook: Agpalo, Professor: Atty. Bathan)

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